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Others ~ Selected Correspondence The Metaphysical
This may be a good opportunity to look at the difference between an experiential report and a metaphysical statement. The way I see it, if someone says: ‘I am capable of thinking, but not of feeling’ ... or ... ‘Thought happens to me (this f&bb), but feeling does not’ ... or ... ‘I experience thinking, but not feeling’ ... they are describing/reporting their experience, and it stops there. On the other hand, if they go on to say: ‘Thought is actual, but feeling is not actual’ they are making a metaphysical statement. Careful. On what grounds are you stating they are making a ‘metaphysical’ statement? What is your working definition of ‘metaphysics?’ What is implicit in your above words – ‘the way I see it?’ Do you see that if you add to this person’s experience that their experience is valid, correct, actual, etc. – then to call a statement such as ‘thought is actual, but feeling is not actual’ a metaphysical statement is simply to strip their experience of validity. What you are doing is turning Richards/actualist experience into a theory, hypothesis, or belief – which is contrary to their report. You simply cannot have it both ways – either the actualist experience is valid or it is not. If you insist on making their statements a theory of some sort, you will consistently distort what is being said. No 37 to No 60, 25.8.2006
Points (1) and (2) are different ways of expressing the same experiential fact, yes? (That is, for one who is actually free or currently having a PCE). Not exactly - as you mention below - (2) is a factual existential statement about what exists. That in itself doesn’t make it metaphysical. Dogs exist. That’s not a metaphysical statement, it is a factual statement. The way I see it (1) is an experiential report, while (2) goes beyond that and presents itself as universally valid metaphysical statement (ie. a statement about what exists and in what way). How does the fact that it is a report coming from direct experience of a certain type exempt it from being a metaphysical statement? Well, it is an ontological statement without being an ‘ontology.’ The reason it can be an ontological statement is that it’s about what does and doesn’t actually exist, yet it isn’t an ‘ontology’ because an ‘ontology’ is a theory about what exists. It is still a statement regarding the nature of what exists and in what way it exists is it not? (That is, it creates the real/actual ontology, and assigns it absolute validity – denying even that it is an ontology). To simply reject speculative metaphysics (in any form) does not mean that (2) is not an metaphysical statement (a statement about what exists and in what way it exists). How could a statement about what exists (and what does not exist and in what way) NOT be a metaphysical statement (regardless of whether it is valid – whatever that really means). Because actualists understand ‘metaphysical’ to intrinsically be speculative, theoretical, philosophical. This is why I say it is an ontological statement - just like ‘physical objects are actual, but immaterial souls are not.’ I would like to pinpoint the source of the apparent disagreement here. Do you regard statements concerning what exists, what does not exist, and in what way they exist as metaphysical statements? If not, why not? I regard a metaphysical statement as an ontological statement about the kinds of things that exist in theory regarding things that are beyond or outside the physical world. The literal meaning of the word refers to something Aristotle wrote that simply came ‘after’ his physics. Of course it has taken on variant meanings, but is typically used regarding what is theorised to exist ‘over and above’ or ‘alongside’ the physical world. The fact that it comes from direct experience is no argument to that effect. Well, if the metaphysical is inherently speculative or theoretical, then direct experience, meaning not speculative or theoretical, is therefore intinsically non-metaphysical. Many different reports come from direct experience too, and in most people’s direct experience it would be absurd to say – for example – ’hunger does not exist in actuality’. Yet, the facts are not settled by what most people experience. No 37 to No 60, 26.8.2006
Before moving on from the definitions, here’s another working definition that seems to fit the way I’ve been using it: ‘It [metaphysics] attempts to tell what anything must be like in order to be at all.’ You do not appear to be using the word ‘metaphysics’ in the same way as actualists understand it. A good page to understand what Richard means by the word is... http://www.actualfreedom.com.au/richard/selectedcorrespondence/sc-metaphysical.htm You can define metaphysics however you want, but you won’t get anywhere if you then try to use your conclusions based on a variant definition to refute those who are using an altogether different definition of the word. Maybe a good question would be – what is ‘metaphysics?’ What is a decent rendition of the actual meaning of the word? No 37 to No 60, 27.8.2006 Design ©The Actual Freedom Trust: 1997-. All Rights Reserved. |
